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Should States Adopt the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code?
GEORGE W. STENGEL*
Prior to the twentieth century there was little use of consumer
credit. Until the advent of the automobile, consumer credit was
generally limited to occasional sales on credit by local merchants
and infrequent borrowings from friends or employers. Although
consumer credit increased gradually from 1900 until World War
II, most of it was utilized in the financing of automobiles or other
expensive hard goods. Most of the loans were made by small loan
companies. In 1950 consumer credit obligations aggregated over
$21,000,000,000.1 Since then, it has increased phenomenally.
From 1950 to 1960 it increased from 21 billion to 56 billion dollars.2
It has now increased to over 120 billion dollars.' As of February
28, 1971, the Federal Reserve Board reported our outstanding
consumer credit to be as follows:'
Installment Credit
Automobile $ 34,869,000,000
Other Consumer Goods 28,928,000,000
Home Repair and Modernization 4,051,000,000
Personal Loans 31,396,000,000
Total Installment Credit $ 99,244,000,000
Non-Installment Credit
Single Payment Loans $ 9,506,000,000
Charge Accounts 7,353,000,000
Service Credit 7,712,000,000
Total Non-Installment Credit $ 24,571,000,000
Total Consumer Credit $123,815,000,000
* Professor of Law, University of Mississippi, B.B.A., 1939, Ohio State; J.D.,
1944, Univ. of Mich., L.L.M., 1948, Harvard. The author wishes to express his
appreciation for the assistance of Mr. James G. Woltermann, a third-year law
student at the University of Kentucky who served as a research assistant for the
author in the preparation of this article.1 U.S. BUREAu op T CENSUS, DEP'T OF CoMMEnC E, STATISTICAL ABsRAcr
OF Th UNrrrn STATES 451 (1970).
21d.
aId.
4 Wall Street Journal, Apr. 5, 1971, at 4, col. 2.
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There seems to be little likelihood of any diminution in this
growth of consumer credit. We have come to rely upon our casual
buy-now-pay-later attitude to accelerate economic growth and to
provide both luxuries and necessities for our affluent society.
Undoubtedly, it has enabled many of us to enjoy comforts of life
which we could not have enjoyed for several years under a cash
economy. But over-indulgence of consumer credit has burdened
a high percentage of American families in every income bracket,
especially the poor. Today, over half of our families are paying
off installment debts which they incurred for the purchase of
consumer goods and services. By the mid-sixties twenty-five
percent of American families had committed one-third of their
income to such payments; ten percent of them had committed at
least forty percent of their income.5 Since those obligations did
not include rent or home mortgage payments, it is obvious that
little income was left in many cases to purchase food and other
necessities. As a result of overcommitments for consumer pur-
chases, personal bankruptcies increased about seven hundred
percent from 1950 to 1970.6
Notwithstanding the tremendous increase in consumer credit
in recent years and the social and economic problems which have
been caused by the increase, there has been little change in state
laws concerning consumer credit. There have been a few minor
changes, such as enactment of small loans laws, installment sales
acts, and laws regarding garnishment and wage assignments. Prior
to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code only a few states, notably
Massachusetts and California, had adopted any comprehensive
legislation aimed at mitigating the hardships of consumer debtors.
In the other states (including Kentucky) consumer credit has
been governed by the laws which were developed for the regula-
tion of debtor-creditor relationship between business men who
were financing business activities. Consumer groups are now
clamoring that the laws which are adequate to govern the debtor-
creditor relationship between business men and business organi-
zations do not provide adequate protection for consumer debtors.
There are innumerable aspects of our present debtor-creditor
law that consumer groups believe to be unfair to consumer
5 CONSUMER RERoRTs, Mar. 1969, at 122.
6 U.S. BuEAu or rm CENSuS, DEP'T OF COMMECE, STATSTICAL ABSTfACT
OF THE UN=TE STATEs 485 (1970).
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debtors. Consideration of a few of their objections to our present
laws will show the basis for their current agitation for more favor-
able treatment for consumer debtors, and lay a foundation for our
consideration of the major provisions of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code.
Probably the foremost objections to present consumer credit
laws arise from what are deemed to be excessive interest rates.
The cost of consumer credit is much higher than the cost of other
types of credit. Of course, that is in part due to the higher risk
and higher cost of servicing consumer credit as compared with
other types of credit. There has also been some gouging by loan
sharks and merchants who specialize in credit sales. Abuses have
also occurred through the use of "add-on contracts," "flipping,"
and loan brokers fees, inter alia.
In combination with consumer finance charges that have
frequently been excessive, much chagrin has been caused by
misleading and inadequate information as to the cost of consumer
credit. Deception has occurred at the time credit is extended, due
to inadequate disclosure of the credit terms, and it has been
aggravated to a large extent by some of our credit advertising.
We now have federal legislation which is aimed at those evils.
The Truth in Lending Act regulates consumer credit cost dis-
closure with respect to credit transactions and credit advertising
[some consumer groups say the act is deficient because it does not
provide standard contract forms].
One of the doctrines of our present debtor-creditor law that
is most abhorred by consumer groups is the holder in due course
rule with respect to negotiable instruments. That rule is, of course,
the whole foundation of our law with regard to commercial paper.
It enables negotiable instruments to circulate almost like money.
But it often causes great hardships to consumer debtors. For
example, a purchaser may sign a negotiable note and give it to the
seller in payment for some goods. He soon finds that the goods
are not as warranted and that he was induced to buy them by
fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of the seller. His first
impulse is to rescind the contract and refuse to make any pay-
ments on the note. However, if the note has been negotiated to a
holder in due course, the maker cannot assert his defenses of
breach of warranty and fraud against the holder. He must pay the
[Vol. 60
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note. His only recourse is to bring a suit against the seller. At
best, the purchaser will be left with an expensive law suit. At
worst, the seller will be outside the jurisdiction, departed for
parts unknown or insolvent. Modification, or abolition, of the
holder in due course rule, insofar as it applies to consumer credit,
is high on the list of reforms advocated by consumer groups.
Another reform advocated by consumer groups is the abolition
of cognovit notes in states where they are legal.7 A cognovit note
contains a warrant of attorney clause providing that, in event of
default, the parties liable on the note empower any attorney at
law to appear for the maker, confess judgment and waive all
errors. In states in which cognovit notes are legal, printed forms
are commonly used which contain blank forms of a petition; an
answer admitting liability on the note and confessing judgment;
and an entry of judgment to be signed by a judge. In suing on a
cognovit note an attorney will fill out the form and take it to
another attorney, anyone he chooses, for confession of judgment.
The other attorney usually examines the note to see that it is in
order and, if so, signs the answer admitting defendant's liability
on the note and confessing judgment against him. The paper will
then be taken to a judge and, if the petition, answer, and note are
in order, he will enter judgment against the defendant. Only a
minute or two are usually devoted to the matter by the judge and
"defendant's" attorney. The whole proceeding is ex parte. The
plaintiff's attorney may now proceed with a levy of execution
and in many cases garnish the defendant's wages.
In many jurisdictions the most oppressive aspect of the con-
sumer credit laws has resulted from garnishment of wages. Em-
ployers, of course, do not like to be bothered with such proceed-
ings. Some employers have taken a very strict attitude toward
employees whose wages were garnished. In many cases the
employee was told that he must avoid garnishment of wages or be
discharged. In states in which prejudgment garnishment was
allowed, such a policy frequently coerced an employee to pay a
fraudulent claim. The most abusive aspects of garnishment of
wages have recently been abolished at the federal level. In
7 A power of attorney to confess judgment before action is instituted is void
in Kentucky. KENTUcKY BEv. STAT. § 372.140 [hereinafter cited as KRS]. There-
fore, cognovit notes are void in Kentucky insofar as they authorize confession of
judgment,
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Snidach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View," the Supreme
Court held a state statute which authorized garnishment prior to
judgment was invalid for failure to satisfy the due process require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment. Also, section 304 of the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibits an employer
from discharging an employee by reason of the fact that his earn-
ings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.
The act also exempts part of an employee's wages from garnish-
ment 9 [consumer groups contend that this federal act does not go
far enough in relieving wage earners from garnishment for con-
sumer debts].
In states in which irrevocable assignments of future wages are
enforceable,10 a debtor may assign his future earnings as payment
or as security for payment of a debt. The creditor may then take
his wages without a court order for garnishment; and the debtor
does not even have an opportunity to have his debt determined
by a court before his wages are taken by his creditor. Consumer
groups are practically unanimous in demanding that irrevocable
wage assignments be banned.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, unless otherwise agreed,
a secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral
on default.'1 In taking possession the secured party may use self-
help if that can be done without a breach of the peace. Re-
possessions of collateral (especially automobiles) are frequently
made in the debtor's absence. Goods are frequently repossessed
after most of the debt secured by the security agreement has been
paid. Until recently, most states permitted the secured creditor
to simply retain the collateral in such cases. Although the debtor
has a right of redemption, that right frequently requires a large
sum of money because of an acceleration clause making the entire
balance payable upon default. That could be very unjust to a
debtor who lost his job after paying off most of the secured obliga-
tion. There are stories circulating about an appliance dealer who
boasted that he had sold and repossessed the same appliance or
8 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673-74 (1970).10 Future wages may be assigned in Kentucky. See KRS §§ 371.110 et seq.
The assignment is not binding on the employer until he assents to it in writing
on the instrument of assignment. KRS § 371.120.11 UNFoRM CommERcLA&. CoDE § 9-503 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
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television set several times. Some of the worst evils of this practice
were mitigated by the Uniform Commercial Code. For example,
under the Uniform Commercial Code, if sixty percent of a secured
obligation on consumer goods has been satisfied, the secured party
must dispose of the collateral within ninety days after taking
possession, and he must use the UCC method of sale.'2
The creditor's remedy of repossession is in many cases greatly
enlarged by an obscure clause in the security agreement providing
that all payments shall be allocated pro rata to all articles pur-
chased from the creditor.' 3 Under such a clause none of the goods
will be fully paid for until the full account is paid. Thus, if a
debtor purchased $3,000 worth of goods from a seller over a five-
year period, without ever completely paying off his account, and
defaulted when $200 was owing on the secured obligation, the
seller could repossess all of the goods he had sold to the debtor
over the five-year period. As might be expected, consumer groups
want to require that the debtor's payments be credited to his
earliest purchases and that the taking of excess security be pro-
hibited.
In a depression or recession, a man who loses his job may not
only lose the goods which he financed by a security agreement,
but he may have a deficiency judgment entered against him. Since
used furnture and appliances will bring only a small fraction of
their original cost, the deficiency judgment, including court costs
may be almost as large as the balance he owed on the debt when
he lost his job. Many consumer groups contend that deficiency
judgments should not be permitted. The secured party would
then have an election of two remedies. He could repossess the
goods or bring an action for the balance owing on the debt.
In many places home solicitation sales give rise to a large
number of consumer grievances. Although some responsible busi-
nesses sell their goods and services in that manner, a large per-
centage of door-to-door salesmen use high pressure techniques.
Often the door-to-door salesman represents an out of state business
establishment. In addition to their high pressure, such salesmen
12 UCC § 9-505.
1 3 The same situation may result from the Kentucky Installment Contracts Act,KRS H§ 371.210-330. That statute requires that payments shall be allocated to all
of the various purchases in the same ratio as the original cash sales prices of the
various purchases bear to the total of all. KRS § 371.290(5).
1971]
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often employ other practices which result in hardships to the
consumer. Frequently, they obtain the buyer's signature on a
negotiable instrument and forthwith negotiate it to a holder in
due course. Sometimes they will obtain a negotiable note secured
by a mortgage on the maker's home. "Referral sales"14 schemes
are also frequently used by door-to-door salesmen. Under such a
scheme, the seller will tell the buyer that the price of the goods
will be reduced by a certain amount for every name provided by
the buyer of persons who subsequently buy similar goods from the
seller. For example, a salesman may sell a buyer some goods for
$1,000 and tell him that he may submit a list of twenty names of
other prospective buyers and receive a credit of fifty dollars for
each of the persons who buy similar goods from the salesman. If
all of the persons buy from the salesman, the buyer will receive
credit for the full purchase price of his goods. Usually, the
buyer will be disappointed in his hopes for referral sales. In the
first place, the buyer's friends are apt to be less gullible than he
was. In the second place, the salesman will usually obtain a
negotiable instrument from the buyer and negotiate it to a holder
in due course, who will not be bound by the salesman's referral
agreement.
All of those problems and many more are dealt with in the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter UCCC].
MAJOR PROVISIONS OF TE CODE:
In General
The UCCC is divided into seven articles. Article I contains
general provisions, rules of construction and definitions. Article 2
deals with credit sales and leases. It prescribes maximum finance
charges and rules for disclosure and advertising, and contains
several limitations on agreements and practices with respect to
credit sales and home solicitation sales. Article 3 contains most
of the provisions concerning consumer loans. It prescribes maxi-
mum finance charges for consumer loans, regulates disclosure and
advertising with regard to such loans and contains several limita-
tions on agreements and practices with respect to them. Articles
14 Referral sales are prohibited in Kentucky. KRS § 436.360; Commonwealth
v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1966).
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2 and 8 contain many similar provisions because one article deals
with credit sales and the other article with loans. Article 4 con-
tains provisions with respect to insurance in connection with con-
sumer credit transactions. Article 5 contains several limitations
on traditional creditors' remedies and provides remedies to debtors
for violations of the Code. It also prescribes criminal penalties for
its violation. Article 6 provides for an administrator for the Code,
defines his powers and functions and provides administrative
remedies for enforcing the Code. Articles 7 and 8 are reserved
for future provisions with respect to consumer credit counseling
and wage earner receiverships. Article 9 prescribes the effective
date of the Code and contains the repealer clause for repeal of
superseded laws.
Because of its comprehensiveness and prolixity, it is impossible
to paraphrase all the provisions of the Code in the space allotted
for a law review article. We can, however, examine its most
important provisions."6
With minor exceptions, the UCCC applies to all consumer
credit transactions and excludes business transactions. Consumer
credit is credit extended for personal, family, household or agri-
cultural purposes of the person to whom the credit is extended
where the amount involved is not over $25,000.16 Real estate
transactions in which the credit cost is in excess of ten percent
are subject to the Code without regard to the $25,000 limit. Real
estate loans at less than ten percent interest are only subject to
IS As was to be expected, a large number of articles have been written (from
various viewpoints) on the U-ro m CoNsutm CREDrT CODE, [hereinafter cited
as UCCC]. For some of the better articles and symposia, see Braucher, Consumer
Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43 TEmp. L.Q. 313 (1970); Copen-
haver, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 71 W. VA. L. IEyv. 1 (1968); Fritz, Would
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25 Bus. L. 511 (1970);
Hogan, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus. L. 159 (1969). Jordan & Warren,
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLum. L. REv. 387 (1968); Littlefield,
Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 272 (1969); Lopucki, UCCC: Consumer Code or Lenders Code?,
22 U. FLA. L. REv. 335 (1970); Malcolm, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25
Bus. L. 937 (1970); Robertson, Consumer Protections Under the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code, 41 Miss. L.J. 36 (1969); Shay, Uniform Consumer Credit Code:
An Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1969); Symposium, Consumer Credit
Protection, 49 NEB. L. REv. 722 (1970); Symposium, Consumer Credit Reform, 33
LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 639 (1968); Symposium, Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1969); Symposium, Consumer Protection, 29 OMo ST. L.J. 593
(1968); Symposium, Consumer Protection, 8 SAN D EGo L. REv. 1 (1971); Sym-
posium, Consumer Protection and the Urban Poor, 37 GEO. WAsu. L. REv. 1013
(1969)V6 JCCC § 2.104; UCCC § 3.104.
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the disclosure and debtor's remedies provisions of the Code."
Loans to individuals for business purposes are subject to the
maximum rate protection of the Code."" The UCCC does not
apply to credit activities of pawnbrokers or to sales of insurance
companies except in connection with a consumer credit trans-
action (under article 4).19
LIMrrATioNs ON INTEREST BATES AND LICENSING OF LNDmEs
The UCCC repeals existing laws fixing maximum credit
charges and replaces them with the same maximum rates for all
types of consumer credit grantors. One of the basic tenets of
the Code is that interest rates should be determined by com-
petition rather than by legislation. Consequently, the Code
establishes ceilings on credit charges (which are rather high) and
provides for "freedom of entry"20 into the consumer financing
field to create competition. The draftsmen of the Code thought
that a combination of credit cost disclosure and freedom of entry
would generally keep consumer credit costs below the maximum
fixed by the Code.
The Code prescribes interest ceilings"- on consumer credit
sales,'2 consumer loans,23 revolving charge accounts2 4 and re-
volving loan accounts.25
The basic maximum rate of interest under the UCCC is
eighteen percent per year. Anyone may lend money at eighteen
percent per year or less. Sellers of goods and supervised lenders
may charge much higher rates. All financial institutions are super-
vised lenders26 and may make loans at rates in excess of eighteen
percent per year. Other persons or organizations may be licensed
as supervised lenders. Sellers of goods may finance their sales
17 UCCC § 2.104(2); UCCC §§ 3.104-.105.
18 UCCC § 3.602.
19 UCCC § 1.202.2 0 See Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry,
24 Bus. L. 227 (1968); White, Consumer Credit in the Ghetto: UCCC Free Entry
Provisions and the Federal Trade Commission Study, 25 Bus. L. 143 (1969).
21 See Benfield, Interest Ceilings and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 56
A.B.A.J. 946 (1970).2 2 UCCC § 2.104.
23 UCCC § 3.104.
24 UCCC § 2.108.
25 UCCC § 3.108.
26 UCCC § 3.502.
27 UCCC § 3.503.
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at rates in excess of eighteen percent without being licensed.
With respect to a supervised loan, including a loan pursuant
to a revolving loan account, the maximum rates are thirty-six
percent on the first $300, twenty-one percent on the next $700
and fifteen percent on the amount in excess of $1,000; but if the
graduated rates yield less than eighteen percent per year, the
maximum is eighteen percent.28
The same maximum rate applies with respect to consumer
credit sales other than revolving charge accounts. On revolving
charge accounts the maximum charges are two percent per month
on the first $500 and one and one-half percent on the remainder.2 9
A minimum charge of five dollars may be charged on an install-
ment sales contract when the amount does not exceed seventy-five
dollars and $7.50 when the amount financed exceeds seventy-five
dollars.30 The minimum for a revolving charge account is fifty
cents per month.3'
Besides the categories already mentioned as subject to the
Code, two other situations may come within its provisions. The
first is a transaction where the parties agree in writing that the
sale or loan is to be made subject to the Code. 2 The second is a
"consumer related sale"3 3 or a "consumer related loan."34 These
classifications are primarily defined in the same way as a consumer
credit sale or consumer loan except that the seller or lender is not
limited to one regularly engaged in similar credit or loan trans-
actions, nor is the purpose of the sale or loan restricted to a per-
sonal, family, household or agricultural purpose but may also
include a sale or loan to an individual for a business purpose. In
addition, a sale or loan in which the debt is secured primarily by
a security interest in a one or two family dwelling occupied by a
person related to the debtor is also included without regard to
whether the sale or loan is made to an individual or an organi-
zation.
The allowable credit service charge on a consumer related sale
made pursuant to a revolving charge agreement is the same two
28 UCCC § 3.508.
29 UCCC § 2.207.30 UCCC § 2.201(6).
31 UCCC § 2.207(4).
32 UCCC § 2.601; UCCC § 3.601.
33 UCCC § 2.602(1); see also UCCC § 2.602, Comment 1.
; VCCC § 3.602(1).
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to one and one-half percent per month limitation that is provided
for revolving charge accounts. Otherwise the credit service
charge or loan finance charge is limited by an eighteen percent
per year rate ceiling.3 5
"Credit Service Charge" and "Loan Finance Charge" lie at the
very heart of the Code's rate limitation, and without a clear
definition of these terms any limitation would be meaningless.
Although the Code does not attempt to restrict the manner of
contracting for the credit service charge or loan financing charge,
it does define those terms both generally and specifically. Gen-
erally, such charges include all charges payable directly or indi-
rectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the
seller or lender as an incident to the extension of credit. More
specifically, they include premiums for insurance protecting the
seller or lender against the debtor's default or other credit loss,
charges incurred for investigating the collateral or the consumer's
creditworthiness, and other listed items and a time price differ-
ential.8" Items which are excluded are default charges, additional
charges,3 7 delinquency charges3 8 and deferral charges.3 9
One of the most controversial features of the Code is its
licensing provisions for sellers and lenders who make credit sales
and loans. Except for supervised loans, the only requirements for
entry into the credit or lending industry is the filing of notification
within thirty days after the commencing of business in the state
(and each year thereafter) 0 and payment of an annual fee.1
But a lender may not engage in the business of making or
collecting loans at interest in excess of eighteen percent until
he has been licensed as a supervised lender. 2 In order to re-
ceive such a license a lender must make an application to the
Administrator of the Code43 containing such information as the
Administrator may require. Before issuing a license the Adminis-
trator must investigate the applicant and his associates if the
35 UCCC § 2.602(2) and (3); see also UCCC § 2.602, Comment 2, UCCC
§ 3.602(2); and UCCC § 3.602, Comment 2.
36 UCCC § 2.109; UCCC § 3.109.
37 UCCC § 2.202; UCCC § 3.202.
38 UCCC § 2.203; UCCC § 3.203.
39 UCCC § 3.204 and 3.205.
40 UCCC § 6.202.
41 UCCC § 6.203.
42 UCCC § 3.502.
43UCCC § 3.503(1).
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application involves a copartnership or association, and the officers
and directors if the application involves a corporation, as to their
financial responsibility, character and fitness so that the Adminis-
trator is satisfied that the business will be operated honestly and
fairly within the purposes of the Code.44 In addition, supervised
lenders are subject to special revocation or suspension provisions 45
and recording, reporting,4 examining and investigation47 pro-
visions. Supervised financial organizations may make loans at
interests in excess of eighteen percent per year without obtaining
a license.48
DiscLosus OF FiNANcE HARCGEs
Disclosure is closely aligned with one of the rate limitation's
purposes, namely, the fostering of increased competition in the
financing industry. It is presumed that a consumer armed with ade-
quate disclosure of the cost of credit will be better able to compare
costs in similar transactions and shop for the lowest cost. But
even if credit shopping does not materialize, it is still a matter of
elementary fairness that a consumer is entitled to a meaningful
disclosure of the pertinent elements of the transaction. Basically,
the Code advances these considerations by providing for a uniform
and understandable disclosure which must be made in writing
to the consumer.49
This writing must include a description of what was pur-
chased, the cash price of the item and the amount of the down
payment, if any; or, in case of a loan, the net amount paid to the
debtor or to his account. The disclosure must also include an
identification and the amount of any charge for registration,
certificate of title, license or official fees and taxes; a description
and the amount of any insurance provided or paid for by the seller
or lender; any additional charges; the dollar amount of the credit
service or loan finance charge; the percentage rate of the credit
service or loan finance charge; the schedule of payments; the
amount of any default or delinquency charge which may become
due because of late payment; and a description of any security
44UCCC § 3.503(1) and (2).
45 UCCC § 3.504.
46 UCCC § 3.505.
47 UCCC § 3.506.
48 UCCC § 3.502.
49 UCCC §§ 2.302 and 3.302.
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interest to be held by the lender or seller and a clear identification
of the property subject to the security interest.50
Where a sale or loan is made pursuant to a revolving charge
or loan account the seller or lender is required to make a dis-
closure before the sale or loan is made5l and, if at the end of any
billing cycle there is an outstanding balance or if a credit service
or loan finance charge is made, there must be another disclosure
within a reasonable time after the end of the billing cycle.52
The disclosure provisions before a sale or loan and at the end
of the billing cycle are essentially the same. They differ to the
extent that the former deals with anticipated rates and charges
on sales and loans not yet made, while the latter deals with rates
and charges made on actual sales and loans. They both call for
a disclosure of the balance upon which a credit service or loan
finance charge is to be computed; the determination of the
credit service or loan finance charge; the percentage used to
calculate the charge; the corresponding annual percentage rate;
and any additional charges.53 With respect to a disclosure at the
end of a billing cycle, the seller or lender must also include the
outstanding balance at the beginning of the cycle; a description
of the activity in the account during the cycle; the outstanding
balance at the end of the cycle; and the time within which the
payment must be made in order to avoid additional credit service
or loan finance charges. 4
The disclosure requirements of the UCCC are substantially
the same as under the federal Truth in Lending Act. The Truth in
Lending Act exempts state-regulated transactions from its opera-
tion if the state regulations are substantially similar to the fed-
eral regulations and there is adequate provision for enforcement. 5
C-EDrr ADVmTiSiNG
Since a consumer may rely upon claims made through adver-
tising as well as by face to face disclosure, it is important that
credit advertising also be regulated. The Code does this by a gen-
-o UCCC §§ 2.306 and 3.306.
53UCCC §§ 2.310(1) and 3.309(1).52UCCC § 2.310(2) and 3.309(2).
53 UCCC §§ 2.310(1) and (2) and 3.309(1) and (2).
54 UCCC §§ 2.310(2) and 3.309(2).55 Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act § 123; 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1968).
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eral prohibition against false or misleading advertising concerning
the terms or conditions of credit with respect to a consumer credit
sale, lease or loan 6 Because of the many and varied forms of
advertising and the unlimited nuances of advertising method, the
Code does not specifically define misleading advertisement. It
does, however, prohibit certain advertising practices. Thus, where
the rate of the credit service or loan finance charge is not staLed
in conformity with the provisions on disclosure 57 or where the
advertisement states the credit service or loan finance charge or
installment payments but does not also state the rate of the charge
and the amount of the installment payments,58 the advertisement
is misleading. The application of this provision is very broad.
It applies to any advertisement in the mass media, including radio,
television, magazines, newspapers, catalogs or by the posting of a
public sign.
The credit advertising provisions of the UCCC are not of great
practical significance, since Chapter 13 of the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act contains similar regulations. There is no
exemption in the federal act with respect to state-regulated credit
advertising.
PRoIrBTED AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICES 50
The "Holder in Due Course" Doctrine
As was pointed out in the first part of this article, one of the
most troublesome doctrines in the field of consumer credit is the
holder in due course doctrine.60 Under the Uniform Commercial
Code a holder of a negotiable instrument who takes the instru-
ment for value, in good faith and without notice of any infirmity
attaching to the instrument becomes a holder in due course and
56 UCCC §§ 2.313(1) and 3.312(1).
57 UCCC §§ 2.313(2) (a) and 3.312(2) (a).
5S8UCCC §§ 2.313(2)(b) and 3.312(2)(b).
GO See Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and the UCC-Limitations, on Creditors'
Agreements and Practices 33 LAW & GOumMT. PROB. 686 (1968); Note, Limita-
tions and Agreements under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 56 IowA L. RE~V.
171 (1970).60 For a discussion of the effect of the UCCC on the holder in due course
doctrine, see Note, Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code for Indiana: Re-
strictions on Negotiability and Waiver of Defenses, 46 IND. L.J. 114 (1970). The
doctrine is criticised, insofar as it applies to consumer credit paper, in Kripke,
Consumer Credit Reform: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 445,
469-73 (1968).
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thus effectively cuts off most defenses that a debtor could set up
against the seller."' For example, when a consumer signs a
negotiable instrument in order to purchase a television set and
the instrument is negotiated to a holder in due course, a breach
of warranty cannot be set up as a defense against the holder in
due course. This may leave the debtor in the unenviable position
of having a television set that does not work but still being re-
quired to pay for it. The Code changes this by providing that in a
consumer credit sale or lease (other than a sale for an agricultural
purpose) a negotiable instrument, other than a check, may not be
used as evidence of the obligation.2 Since this prohibition will
be well known in the financial community, a transferee of a
negotiable instrument arising from a consumer sale usually will
not be a holder in due course. However, a second or third taker
of the instrument may not know about its consumer origin and,
if the other requirements are satisfied, may become a holder in
due course. 63
An effect similar to that of the holder in due course doctrine
may be achieved under the UCC by the use of a clause in a non-
negotiable note or contract providing that the buyer or lessee will
not assert defenses against an assignee that he might have against
the seller or lessor. 4 With respect to this problem two alternative
provisions are provided by the Code. The first is a negation of
any agreement which purports to deny the debtor the right to
raise his defenses against the assignee.65 The second alternative
allows such an agreement but limits the right of the assignee to
enforce it. The agreement is only enforceable if the assignee is not
related to the seller or lessor, acquires the contract in good faith,
for value and, most importantly, if the assignee gives notice to the
buyer or lessee of the assignment and for a period of three months
following the mailing the assignee receives no written notification
of any claim or defense on the part of the buyer or lessee. The
assignee in his notice to the buyer or lessee must include the
fact that, if the assignee does not receive a written notice of any
claim or defense within three months, he has a right to enforce.
61 UCC § 3.305.
62 UCCC § 2.403.
63 UCCC § 2.403 and Comment.
64 UCC § 9.206.
65 UCCC § 2.404, Alternative A.
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the contract regardless of the right or claim. This provision only
relates to a claim or defense arising during the three months after
the notice is mailed, and any claim or defense arising after that
period is enforceable against the assignee by way of defense or
set-offA6
Security in Consumer Credit Transactions
A creditor may seek to protect his claim by acquiring a security
interest in property of the debtor. He may, of course, retain a
security interest in the goods sold until they are paid for. But,
because of his superior bargaining position, the creditor is usually
able to acquire a security interest, not only in the goods sold, but
also in other property of the debtor. Where the debt is minimal
it becomes unfair for the creditor to acquire a security interest
in other property and thereby restrict the right of the debtor to
the unfettered use of his own property, including the right to
dispose of that property if he sees fit to do so. With the exception
of cross collateral, 17 the Code provides that where the debt is
minimal the creditor is limited to a security interest in the goods
sold. In this regard minimal means that additional security may
not be taken in other goods if the debt is less than $300, or an
additional securiity interest may not be taken in land if the debt
is less than $1,000. Where the debt is not minimal the creditor is
still limited as to the additional security that he may take. In a
sale of goods he may take a security interest in other property
only if the goods sold become closely connected with the goods
or land in which the security interest is taken. Where the sale is
of services a security interest may only be taken in goods or land
if the services are performed on the goods or are used to maintain,
repair or improve the land. In a sale of land or in a lease situation,
no security interest may be taken in other goods or land of the
buyer. 18 This restriction does not apply to sales of land in which
the credit service charge is ten percent or less or to sales and leases
for agricultural purposes.6 9
66 UCCC § 2.404, Alternative B.
67 UCCC § 2.408.
68 UCCC § 2.407 and Comment.
69 UCCC § 2.407 and Comment.
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Cross-Collateral
As stated above, the Code allows a debt to be secured by cross-
collateral. Under that type of agreement, a seller who makes
more than one sale of goods to a buyer on credit may secure each
debt by a cross security in the other goods so long as the seller
has an existing security interest in the other goods.70 However,
where a seller makes use of a cross-collateral agreement and does
not consolidate the two debts, the rate of the credit service charge
payable by the debtor is limited to that which could have been
made if the debts had been consolidated. 71 This prevents the
seller from taking the advantage which cross-collateral provides
without also allowing the debtor the lower rates that would result
if the debts were consolidated.
Another abuse associated with a cross-collateral agreement,
or a consolidated debt secured by the goods from more than one
sale, involves the manipulation of payments in which the original
debt and succeeding debts are left partially open so that the
security accumulates until the entire debt is paid off.72 The Code
prevents this by providing a first-payment-against-first-debt rule.
When the first debt is paid, the security interest in those goods
terminates.73
Balloon Payments
A payment which is substantially greater than the average of
prior payments is commonly referred to as a balloon payment.
For example, goods may be sold for a price of $2,500 payable in
installments of $100 per month for eleven months and a final
payment of $1,400. A balloon payment can be used to induce a
buyer to enter into an agreement by offering him invitingly small
payments. At the end of the payment period, he is confronted
with a large payment which he may be unable to pay, thus
forcing him to refinance on the creditor's terms or default on the
payment. The Code resolves this problem by granting the debtor
the right to refinance the amount of the balloon payment on the
same terms as the original sale if any payment is more than twice
7oUCCc § 2.408(1).
7 UCCC § 2.408(2).
72 E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
78 UCCC § 2.409.
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the average of prior scheduled payments.7 4 The remedy for a
balloon payment is applicable to both sales and loans, but it does
not apply to a sale or loan primarily for an agricultural purpose
or to payments on revolving charge and loan accounts.
Referral Sales
The referral sale is another method of making a high price
attractive to an unwary consumer. In a typical referral sale75 the
seller, in order to close the sale at an inflated price, offers to
reduce the cost of the item purchased by a certain amount for
every person whose name is supplied by the purchaser and who
subsequently agrees to buy from the seller. Often times the pur-
chaser believes that this will substantially reduce the amount he
will have to pay. Unfortunately for the purchaser, his friends will
probably not be as naive as he was, and no additional sales will
be made, so that the purchaser is stuck with paying the inflated
price.
Because of the pervasive use of this type of arrangement the
Code has prohibited referral sales and provided harsh penalties
for violations of this provision. A person who is induced to buy
goods by the referral sales technique may, at his option, either
rescind the agreement or keep the goods or the benefit of any
services rendered with no obligation to pay for them.76
Home Solicitation Sales
Although high pressure salesmanship can be practiced any-
where, the sale in the home is particularly susceptible to such
methods. Since it is impossible to distinguish between high
pressure techniques and legitimate sales efforts, the Code allows
a limited right of rescission of all sales made in the buyer's home.
Where a solicitation for the sale of goods is made at the buyer's
residence and the buyer binds himself to the agreement at his
74 UCCC §§ 2.405 and 3.402.
75 As examples of use of the referral sales technique, see In re State of New
York (ITM, Inc.), 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966); Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281
N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967); Mathews v. Aluminum Acceptance Corp., 1 Mich. App. 570,
137 N.W.2d 280 (1965); Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 N.M.
575, 396 P.2d 186 (1964); Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa.
Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
76 UCCC § 2.411.
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residence,7 7 the Code provides a right to cancel within three busi-
ness days after the agreement is signed. 8 The buyer must be
apprised of his right to cancel by a statement to that eftect
included in the sale agreement or offer.79 Cancellation is effective
upon the buyer's mailing of a written notification to the sellerbO
When the buyer cancels a home solicitation sale, the seller
must return to him any payment or evidence of indebtedness
within ten days after cancellation.8' However, the seller is entitled
to a cancellation fee of five percent of the cash price, but not
exceeding the cash down payment. The seller is not entitled to
the cancellation fee if the buyer has other grounds on which to
avoid the agreement.8 2 Until the seller has complied with his
obligation to return any payment or evidence of indebtedness, the
buyer may enforce a lien on property retained by him.83 Once
the seller has complied, the buyer must, on demand, give up any
goods delivered to him, but he is only required to return the
property at the place of his residence.8 4 If no demand is made
within forty days, the goods become the property of the buyer
without obligation to pay for them. 85
To protect the seller from possible abuse of this provision by
the buyer, a home solicitation sale does not include a sale made
pursuant to a pre-existing revolving charge account, or a sale
made pursuant to prior negotiations between the parties at the
seller's place of business or a sale of farm equipment.8 6 Also ex-
cluded is a situation in which the buyer requests the seller to
provide goods or services without delay because of an emerg-
ency, and the cancellation would cause an unavoidable loss to
the seller.8 7
Attorney's Fees
In many jurisdictions, a provision in a sale, lease or loan
agreement may allow the creditor an attorney's fee upon the
7 UCCC § 2.501.78UCCC § 2.502(1).
79 UCCC § 2.503.S0 UCCC § 2.502(3).
s1 UCCC § 2.504(1).82 UCCC § 2.504(3).
83 UCCC § 2.504(4).
84 UCCC § 2.505(1).
85 Id.
86 UCCC § 2.501.
s7UCCC § 2.502(5).
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debtor's default and referral of the claim to an attorney. The
code provides two alternatives with respect to attorney fees. The
first alternative prohibits such provisions and makes them unen-
forcible. 8 Under the second alternative, the parties may provide
for a reasonable attorney's fee, which shall not exceed fifteen
percent of the unpaid debt after the default; the attorney must
not be a salaried employee, lessor or lender, or assignee if the
seller."9 These alternatives reflect the divergent opinions as to
whether the cost of collection is a part of the seller's general over-
head or an expense which should be borne by the defaulting
party.
Wage Assignments
Collection, of course, is a sine qua non of the creditor's busi-
ness. Without quick and sure methods of meeting a default, the
creditor would soon be out of business. However, certain prac-
tices have developed which allow the creditor protection against
default to the exclusion of the debtor's most basic rights, e.g., his
right to a judicial hearing before his property is taken from him.
One of the means by which a creditor may circumvent the judicial
process is by the use of an irrevocable wage assignment. 0 Ordi-
narily the assignment is taken as either payment or security for
the debt and, because of its irrevocable nature, continues to
remain in force despite any defense or right of set-off that the
debtor might have against the creditor. Although the debtor's
rights are not lost because of the wage assignment, it does force
him to initiate a suit to enforce his rights and, while the debtor
is availing himself of the judicial process, the creditor is arbitrarily
collecting the debtor's wages. To prevent such injustices the Code
makes all wage assignments revocable by the debtor; this pro-
vision applies to sales and leases as well as to loans."1
88 UCCC §§ 2.413 alt. A, 3.404 alt. A.
89 UCCC §§ 2.413 alt. B 3.404 alt. B.
9o Apparently, some credit unions rely on wage assignments in making loans.
Frank Rubel, Executive Secretary of the New York State Credit Union League
recently stated: "In fact, 99 percent of the loans that the Municipal Credit Union
makes are based on the wage assignment with no co-makers, no security .... I
believe in it thoroughly." Hearings on H.R. 11601 before the Subcomm. on Con-
sumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 1204 (1967).91 UCCC §§ 2.410, 3.403.
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Confession of Judgment
The Code prohibits the use of cognovit notes in consumer
sales. Under the Code, confession of judgment clauses are void. 2
This will free the debtor from the arbitrary entering of a judgment
without a true judicial determination.
Consumer Credit Insurance
The phenomenal rise in the amount of consumer credit has
necessitated an increased use of credit insurance to protect credi-
tors from hazards which would curtail or preclude a debtor's
ability to repay. A corresponding benefit is provided to the
debtor, in that any payment made from the insurance satisfies the
debtor's obligation to the extent of the payment. But credit
insurance is of value to the debtor only when it is limited to the
scope of the transaction, and when it exceeds this, as when the
period of insurance is longer than the period of the contract, the
cost becomes an unnecessary burden on him. In order to allow
for the beneficial use of credit insurance while guarding against
its abuses, the Code regulates insurance which is provided in
relation to a consumer credit sale, lease or loan and where one of
the benefits is the satisfaction of the debt in whole or in part.
Ordinarily, this takes the form of a policy insuring against the
death or disability of the debtor and, to a lesser extent, insuring
against the loss of earnings due to loss of employment. However,
the code specifically excludes insurance which would indemnify
the creditor against loss due to the debtor's default.
Under the Code's insurance provisions a creditor may require
insurance as an incident to the extension of credit, but the debtor
is not limited to the insurance provided by the creditor but may
use an existing policy or obtain a policy from another source which
will comply with the creditor's requirements. However, if the
debtor attempts to provide his own insurance, the creditor may
reject the insurance provided by the debtor if he has reasonable
cause for so doing.93
Where the insurance is provided by the creditor, the Code
limits the policy to an amount and period not in excess of what is
92 UCCC §§ 2.415, 3.407.
931 VCCC § 4.109,
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necessary to protect against the exigencies insured against. 4 The
insurance ordinarily commences when the debtor becomes obli-
gated or when he applies for the insurance, whichever is later,95
and extends no longer than 15 days after the last scheduled due
date." At its inception the amount of coverage may not exceed
the debt and must be reduced proportionately with the reduction
of the debt.9 7 In the case of a revolving charge or loan account,
since the amount may vary from month to month, the amount of
coverage is limited to an amount reasonably commensurate with
the amount of debt as it exists from time to time.98 A creditor
may not charge the debtor more for insurance than the premium
charged by the insurer.99
In addition to the limitations already mentioned, the code
provides additional protection to debtors by placing broad super-
visory powers in the Commissioner of Insurance. Before a creditor
may use a form or a schedule of premium rates or charges the cred-
itor must file with the Commissioner all policies, certificates of in-
surance, notices of proposed insurance, applications for insurance,
endorsements, credits relating to consumer credit insurance and
the schedules of premium rates or charges for credit insurance.100
Limitations on Creditor's Remedies
Although the Code provides the consumer with a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms and safeguards against certain unfair
agreements, it cannot protect a person from all of his financial fol-
lies. The man who consistently extends his credit beyond his ability
or willingness to repay will be with us as long as the freedom of
contract exists. Often, however, a prodigal consumer is led to
financial ruin by a creditor who willingly underwrites marginal
credit risks because of the measure of protection afforded him by
the courts. The Code attempts to increase the wariness of
creditors toward marginal credit risks by limiting some of the
creditors' judicial remedies.
The first of these limitations deals with deficiency judg-
94 UCCC § 4.201.
95 UCCC § 4.201(1).
96 UCCC § 4.201(3).
97 UCCC § 4.202(1).98 UCCC § 4.202(2).
09 UCCC § 4.107(1).
100 UCCC § 4.203(2).
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ments.110 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, whenever a
debtor is in default, the secured creditor may repossess the col-
lateral, dispose of it, and after application of the proceeds to the
outstanding debt, sue for any amount still owing. 02 The inequity
of this situation lies in the fact that usually the security is of
little value on the commercial market, even though it may be of
considerable value to the debtor and his family. The result is an
extreme hardship to the family in exchange for a small monetary
realization to the creditor. Although the Code allows a creditor
to repossess any collateral, it provides that in a consumer credit
sale of goods or services with a sale price of less than $1,000, a
seller who repossesses or voluntarily accepts the surrender of his
collateral has elected his remedy and the debtor is not liable for
any balance left owing after the disposition of the collateral.' 3
If the creditor elects to bring an action against the debtor, rather
than claiming his goods, he may not repossess the goods or subject
them to levy or other judicial proceedings pursuant to the judg-
ment.10' The creditor must elect to sue for the debt or repossess
the goods. He cannot do both. It is important to note that this
provision does not apply to a consumer lease or loan situation.
Secondly, the Code restricts the use of garnishmen' 0 5 proceed-
ings. It prohibits any garnishment of unpaid wages before judg-
ment is entered.106 After a judgment is entered, the amount of
wages subject to garnishment is limited to the smaller of 25%
of disposable earnings or disposable earnings in excess of forty
times the minimum wage.'0 7 These provisions assure a debtor
that he will have his day in court and that, even if his wages are
garnished, he will retain enough of his earnings to be able to
support himself and his dependents. Frequently, as a result of a
garnishment or attempted garnishment the debtor may lose his
101 See Note Repossession and Deficiency Judgments-Will the Consumer
Credit Code Aid the Consumer or Vendor?, 2 CoNN. L. REv. 202 (1969).
102 UCC §§ 9-501 to 9-507.
103 UCCC § 5.103(3).
104 UCCC § 5.103(6).
10 5 For a comparison of the present law as to garnishment of wages with
the provisions of the UCCC, see Moran, Relief for the Wage Earner: Regulation
of Garnishment Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 12 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REV. 101 (1970) and Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 38 U. CN. L. REv.
338 (1969).
,oUCCC § 5.104. In that respect the Code merely states the present law.
See Snidach v. Family Finance Corp. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
10 7 UCCC § 5.105(2).
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job and thus further diminish his ability to repay. Since discharge
of the employee benefits neither the debtor nor the creditor, the
Code prohibits the employer from discharging an employee be-
cause of a garnishment or attempted garnishment.""8 The pro-
visions relating to garnishment are applicable to consumer leases
and loans as well as to consumer credit sales.109
In some cases the debtor's failure to pay is due to an onerous
agreement which was imposed on him despite the safeguards
provided by law. For that eventuality the Code provides a general
power in the courts to negate or restrict the application of any
unconscionable agreement or any unconscionable clause in an
agreement. 10 The term unconscionable is not defined by the
Code, and its generality allows a court to review the underlying
facts and circumstances of the situation before deciding whether
the clause or agreement is unconscionable.
Debtor's Remedies
Under the UCCC a negotiable instrument, other than a check,
may not be used in a consumer credit sale or lease as evidence
of the buyer or lessee's indebtedness."' If a seller violates this
provision, civil penalties are available. Similarly if a lender
violates the provision on schedule of payments or loan terms for
regulated loans," 2 he is liable to civil penalties. In either case
the debtor is not obligated to pay the credit service or loan finance
charge, and he has a right to recover a penalty in an amount
determined by the court which cannot be in excess of three times
the amount of the credit service or loan finance charge. Recovery
may be had from the person who violates the provision or from
his assignee if the assignee undertakes direct collection of pay-
ments or enforcement of rights arising from the debt."3
Where a charge is made in excess of that allowed by the Code,
the debtor is not obligated to pay the excess charge, and if he has
paid it, he has a right to a refund. A refund may be made by
direct payment to the debtor or by the reduction of his obli-
108 UCCO § 5.106.
109 UCCC § 5.104.
110 UCCC § 5.108.
II' UCCC § 2.403.
112 UCCC § 3.511.
113 UCCC § 5.202(1).
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gation,114 but if the refund is not made within a reasonable time
after demand, the debtor may recover a penalty in an amount
determined by a court which shall not exceed the greater of
either the amount of the credit service or loan finance charge
or ten times the amount of the excess charge.115 Again the debtor
may recover against the person who violates the provision or
from an assignee of his rights who undertakes direct collection of
payments or enforcement of rights arising from the debt.116 An
additional penalty provision is added to deal with a creditor who
deliberately makes excess charges and attempts to avoid a penalty
by making a prompt refund if he is caught. The Code provides
that the penalty for failure to refund may be levied against a
creditor, even if the excess charge has been refunded, if the excess
charge was made in deliberate violation, or in reckless disregard
of, these provisions.1 17
If a creditor makes a supervised loan, that is a loan at interest
in excess of eighteen percent in violation of the provision appli-
cable to supervised loans,11 the loan is void and the debtor is not
obligated to pay either the principal or the loan finance charge.
If he has paid any part of the principal or of the loan finance
charge, he has a right to recover the payment from the person
violating the provision or from an assignee of that person's rights
who undertakes direct collection of payments or enforcement of
rights arising from the debt.-19
A creditor may, however, relieve himself of the liability im-
posed by all of the aforementioned remedies and penalties,
except those concerning the negation and right to a refund of
excess charges, if he establishes by a preponderance of evidence
that the violation was unintentional or was the result of a bona
fide error.120
Other remedies and penalties provided by this article deal
with discharge from employment due to garnishment and viola-
tion of the disclosure provisions. Under the garnishment pro-
visions an employee may not be discharged by his employer be-
114 UCCC § 5.202(3).
115 UCCC § 5.202(4).
116 UCCC § 5.202(3).
.17UCCC § 5.202(4).
118 UCCC § 3.502.
119 UCCC § 5.202(2).
120 UCCC § 5.202(7).
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cause a creditor of the employee subjected or attempted to subject
the employee's unpaid wages to garnishment or like proceeding. 121
If an employer discharges a person in violation of this provision,
he is liable to the employee for lost wages, not to exceed six weeks,
and may be ordered to reinstate the employee.'122
Where a creditor, in violation of the disclosure provisions,
other than provisions relating to advertising,'2 3 fails to disclose
information to a person entitled to the information, he is liable
to that person for the sum of twice the credit service or loan
finance charge, but not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, and
the costs of the action and reasonable attorney's fees.24 How-
ever, a creditor has no liability for failure to disclose if, within
fifteen days after discovering an error, and prior to the institution
of an action under this provision or the receipt of written notice
of the error, the creditor notifies the debtor of the error and
makes whatever adjustments in the appropriate account are neces-
sary to assure that the person will not be required to pay a credit
service or loan finance charge in excess of the amount or per-
centage rate actually disclosed.2 5 In any case, no liability will
attach if the creditor shows by a preponderance of evidence that
the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide
error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid the error.12 6
Ciminal Penalties
Where the conduct of a creditor is in willful violation of
certain provisions of the UCCC, a criminal penalty may be
imposed in addition to any applicable civil remedy. The conduct
subject to this section includes three specific violations, viz.,
licensing violations,'27 excessive charges128 and disclosure viola-
tions.:"9 The first occurs when a person willfully engages in the
making of supervised loans without a license to make such loans,
121 UCCC § 5.106.
122 UCCC § 5.202(6).
123 UCCC §§ 2.313 and 3.312.
124 UCCC § 5.203(1).
125 UCCC § 5.203(2).
126 UCCC § 5.203(3).
127 UCCC § 5.301(2) and (3).
'
28 UCCC § 5.301(1).
1 2UCCC § 5.302,
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and the lender is liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or both. 30 Where a person willfully engages in the
business of making consumer credit sales, consumer leases or
consumer loans, or of taking an assignment of rights arising from
these transactions, and undertakes direct collection or enforce-
ment without notifying the Administrator or without paying the
applicable fees, he is liable for a fine not exceeding $100."'1 A
supervised lender who willfully makes charges in excess of those
permitted by the supervised loan provisions of the Code, is
liable for a fine or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or
both.1 2 And a person who willfully and knowingly fails to com-
ply with any requirement of the Code concerning disclosure may
be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment
not exceeding one year, or both. 13 Specifically prohibited mis-
conduct includes giving false or inaccurate information, failure
to provide required information, 34 or the use of an authorized
rate table or chart in a manner which consistently understates the
annual percentage rate.135
Administration
Although many novel ideas are embodied in the UCCC, one
of the most interesting, and perhaps the most far-reaching, is the
creation of the Office of Administrator to enforce the Code and
aid consumers. Although the Administrator's powers are meant
to compliment the civil and criminal remedies available to the
consumer, in a larger sense they offer a new concept to consumr
protection by providing a state officer to institute actions to en-
force the Code. Often a debtor who has a civil remedy does not
avail himself of it because of lack of knowledge or insufficiency of
funds with which to bring an action. Criminal remedies often
fail to provide effective control over abusive credit transactions
because of the limited scope of cases to which criminal penalties
apply and the necessity of proving willfulness.3 6 Thus, the Code's
130 UCCC § 5.301(2).
1'1 UCCC § 5.301(3).
132 UCCC § 5.301(l).
133 UCCC § 5.302.
134 UCCC § 5.302(1).
135 UCCC § 5.302(2).136 See McCaffrey, Administrative Enforcement Under the Oklahoma Version
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 28 BluF CASE 267 (1970).
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addition of an Administrator, whose function is to protect the
consumer, creates a powerful ally for the beleaguered consumer.
The jurisdiction of the Administrator extends to persons who
make or solicit consumer credit sales, consumer leases, consumer
loans, consumer related sales and consumer related loans, or any
person who directly collects payments from or enforces rights
against a debtor arising from such sales, leases or loans. 137 As can
be seen, this is a broad jurisdiction which covers any transaction
subject to the Code's regulation. The Administrator's powers and
duties include consumer counseling and education,13 supervision
of certain loans, 39 investigatory powers 40 and enforcement.'
4
'
The various disclosure rules, rate limitations and other pro-
visions designed to protect the consumer can only be effective if
the consumer is aware of them and understands his rights. For
that reason, an essential part of the Administrator's job is to
counsel persons and groups as to their rights and duties under the
Code; to establish programs for the education of consumers with
respect to credit practices and problems; and to make studies
appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Code
and make the results av-ilable to the public.1
42
The Administrator's power over regulated and supervised
lenders has already been mentioned in the section dealing with
licensing. With regard to supervised lenders his power goes
beyond mere licensing and includes the authority to investigate a
licensee 43 and suspend or revoke a license.' A supervised lender
is required to maintain records in such a manner as to enable the
Administrator to determine whether the licensee is complying with
the Code's provision.'45 The Administrator has access to the records
of lenders, and he is required to examine the loans, business, and
records of every licensee at intervals which he deems appro-
priate. 146 In order to augment the general power to examine and
investigate, the Administrator is impowered to administer oaths,
137 UCCC § 6.102.
138 UCCC § 6.104.
139 UCCC § 6.105.
140 UCCC § 6.106.
141 UCCC §§ 6.108-6.113.
142 UCCC § 6.104 and comment.
143 UCCC § 3.506.
144UCCC § 3.504.
145 UCCC § 3.505(1).
'46 UCCC § 3.506(1).
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subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, adduce evidence,
and require the production of any matter which is relevant to the
investigation.147 If a person fails to obey a subpoena or to give
testimony, without a lawful excuse, the Administrator may apply
to the courts for an order compelling compliance with his orders.148
After notice and a hearing the Administrator may, upon
proper cause, revoke or suspend a license for a period not in excess
of six months. A license may be revoked or suspended if the
licensee has repeatedly and willfully violated the provisions of
the Code or any rule or order lawfully made pursuant to the Code,
or, if facts or conditions exist which would clearly have justified
the Administrator in refusing to grant a license if they had been
known to exist at the time the application for the license was
made.149 With respect to a regulated financial organization, the
powers of investigation and administrative enforcement shall be
exercised by the agency to whose supervision it is subject, but
such organizations are subject to all other powers of the Ad-
ministrator. 50
With respect to investigations of creditors other than super-
vised lenders, the Administrator's power to investigate is limited
to situations in which he has probable cause to believe that a
person has violated a provision of the Code which is subject to
action by him.' 5' Where probable cause exists, he may use the
same means of discovering evidence as in investigations of super-
vised lenders. 52
In order to prevent conduct which is in violation of the Code's
provisions, the Administrator may seek voluntary compliance. 5 3
If voluntary compliance fails, he may either issue a cease and
desist order (after notice and a hearing),154 or he may bring a
civil suit to restrain the violation. 55 Where a cease and desist
order is issued, it is not enforceable against the person until a
judicial enforcement order is secured by the Administrator. How-
ever, if no appeal is made within thirty days after receipt of the
147 UCCC § 3.506(3).
148 UCCC § 3.506(4).
'49 UCCC § 3.504(1).
150 UCCC § 6.105(1).
151 UCCC § 6.106(1).
152 Id.
153 UCCC § 6.104(1) (a).
'54UCCC § 6.108(1).
155 UCCC § 6.110.
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order, it becomes final. To obtain judicial enforcement of the
final order the Administrator need only show the issuance of the
order in compliance with the Code's provisions, a failure to appeal
by the person against whom the order is directed, and jurisdiction
of the court. The Administrator does not, in this situation, have
to support his findings by substantial evidence. 15 Ordinarily the
Administrator may choose between his administrative or civil
remedy except in a situation involving an unconscionable agree-
ment or fraudulent or unconscionable conduct. In that case he is
limited to his civil remedy.157 Also, if the Administrator wants
temporary relief pending final determination of the issue, he must
seek it by his civil remedy.158
One of the most important of the Administrator's remedies is
the injunction against unconscionable agreements or unconscion-
able or fraudulent conduct. Although it can only be procured
by means of a civil suit, this remedy provides the Administrator
with needed flexibility and allows him to deal with new patterns
of fraudulent or unconscionable conduct which have not been
foreseen by the Code's draftsmen.'59 These provisions cover three
areas of fraudulent or unconscionable conduct which may be
restrained: (1) the making or enforcing of unconscionable con-
tract terms; (2) fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in inducing
consumers to enter into a consumer credit transaction; and (3)
fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in the collection of con-
sumer credit debts. 160 To give some guidance in these three areas,
the Code provides a five factor analysis which is to be considered
when applying the provisions on unconscionability and fraud.'6'
For example, one factor to be considered is the knowledge of the
seller at the time of the sale of the inability of the buyer to receive
substantial benefit from the property sold.162 In this way the
word "unconscionable" gains added meaning while still retaining
the flexibility which may be necessary to challenge new methods
of credit abuse in the future.
Where a debtor is due a refund from his creditor because of
156 UCCC § 6.108(1) comment 1.
157 UCCC § 6.111.
158 UCCC § 6.112.
159 UCCC § 6.111 comment 2.
160 UCCC § 6.111(1).
161 UCCC § 6.111(3).
162 UCCC § 6.111(3) (b).
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the making or collecting of excessive charges, the Administrator
may, after demand, bring a civil action to enforce the debtor's
rights. This action may also include recovery of penalties which
have accrued because of the refusal to refund within a reasonable
time after demand or because the excess charges were made in
deliberate violation or reckless disregard of the provisions relating
to finance charge limitations. An action by the Administrator may
relate to transactions with more than one debtor. 16 3
Laws Repealed by the Code
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code is a comprehensive
statute designed to regulate most aspects of consumer credit
charges and interest rates in general. It covers credit sales of
consumer goods and services, consumer loans, some home financ-
ing credit and some agricultural credit.164 Consequently, any state
that adopts the Code will have to repeal or amend several of its
existing statutes. For example, all usury laws and other statutes
limiting interest rates, except those pertaining to pawnbrokers,
must be repealed. Other statutes that must be repealed or
amended include small loan acts and acts licensing personal
lenders, sales finance companies and consumer finance com-
panies installment sales acts for motor vehicles and other goods;
statutes with regard to revolving charge accounts and credit
cards; state truth-in-lending acts; statutes pertaining to home
solicitation sales and referral sales; home improvement sales and
loan acts; and insurance premium financing acts.16 5
Obviously, the drafting of a repealer clause for any state will
require a detailed study. Consequently, any state contemplating
adoption of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code should employ
a competent person or persons to determine which of its present
laws should be repealed or amended when the Code is adopted.
In many states the draftsmen of the repealer clause will be
greatly aided by studies that have already been made,166 some
of which are quite thorough.
163 UCCC § 6.113(1).
164 Note to UCCG § 9.103.
165 Id.
166 E.g., Note, Alabama Consumer Credit Law: A Description and Criticism,
22 ALA. L. 11Ev. 627 (1970); Note, Legislative Process in Alabama: A Microcosm-
The 1969 Regular Session and The Consumer Credit Fiasco, 23 ALA. L. R1v. 181(Continued on next page)
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In most states the principal statutes that must be repealed or
amended, upon adoption of the UCCC, will be quite obvious.
For example, in Kentucky the list will include the statutes on
interest and usury,167 petty loan companies, 168 installment sales
contracts, 6 9 the Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act, 7 0 the
statutes on credit life and credit health insurance,""' some of the
provisions with respect to credit unions, 1'7 2 the exemption from
garnishment, ' 3 and the "chain" Merchandising Act.11 4 Only on-
section of the Uniform Commercial Code will need to be amended,
viz., section 9-203, '75 which gives priority to certain other laws
over the Uniform Commercial Code. The section must be
amended by adding the Uniform Consumer Credit Code to the
list of such statutes and deleting the statutes which are repealed
by the UCCC.
In addition to the above laws, the entire statutes of a state
should be examined when the UCCC is adopted to make sure
that all conflicting statutes are repealed or amended to conform
to the code.
The UCCC does not have a general repealer clause, such as
the one in the Uniform Commercial Code,1 6 which repeals all
acts and part of acts which are inconsistent with it. With only a
specific repealer clause, the draftsman must exercise even more
care in ascertaining the statutes to be repealed. Perhaps a general
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(1970); Abraham, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code-Good or Bad for Georgia?,
GA. S.B.J. 219 (1970); Spanogle, Advantages and Disadvantages-Comparison of
the Present Maine Law and the U3C, 22 ME. L. REv. 295 (1970); Symposium, The
Uniform Commercial Code and its Effects on Present Minnesota Laws, 55 MNmN.
L. REv. 523 (1971); Note, Oregon Credit Regulation and the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code: Old Problems-New Answers, 49 OnE. L. REv. 97 (1969); Malcolm
and Willier, Uniform Consumer Credit Code for Massahusetts?-"A Dialogue",
54 MAss. L.Q. 34 (1969); McNair and Bornheimer, Uniform Consumer Credit
Code-A Michigan Comparison, 49 MIcH. S.B.J. 22 (1970); Clark, Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code: Assessing Its Impact on One State and Plugging Its Loopholes,
18 Kw.. L. REV. 277 (1970); Malcolm and Wood, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code-How It Would Affect Existing Pennsylvania Law, 40 PENN. B.A.Q. 450
(1969); Note, Uniform Consumer Credit Reform in Virginia, 28 WAsHe. & LvE L.
REv. 75 (1971).
167 KRS § 360 et seq.
168 KRS § 288 et seq.
169 KRS §§ 371.210 to 371.990.
170 KRS §§ 190.090 to 190.140.
171 KRS § 301 Subtitle 19.
172 KRS § 290.001 et seq.
13 KRS § 427.010.
174 KRS § 436.360.
175 KRS § 355.9-203.
176 UCC § 10-103.
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repealer clause should be added. That is done in the National
Consumer Act. 171
CnrrMCIsM OF THE CODE AND PROPOSED AmimDmENs
The drafting of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code was
financed for the most part by lenders. The advisory committee
represented the American Bankers Association, finance companies,
retailers associations, house-to-house salesmen, credit card com-
panies and Better Business Bureaus. Several professors who
presumably were neutral, also participated in the drafting. There
was little or no representation of consumers when the Code was
drafted. Nevertheless, the Code provides many more benefits for
consumer debtors than for creditors. There are only a few pro-
visions that would enhance creditor's rights.
Some creditors would benefit from a repeal of the usury laws.
Under the Code anyone could lend money at up to eighteen per-
cent interest without a license. Supervised lenders could loan
money at much higher rates, with no limit placed on the number
of such lenders. Retailers could sell on credit at high interest
rates without obtaining licenses. The Code would enable multi-
state sellers and lenders to standardize credit forms. It also is
designed to provide an escape from federal enforcement of the
Truth-in-Lending Act.
On the other hand, several consumer abuses would be abated
or mitigated by the UCCC. For example, wage assignments,
cognovit notes and referral sales would be prohibited. The holder
in due course doctrine would be greatly limited in its appli-
cation to consumer debtors. Consumer debtor abuses caused
by garnishment of wages would be greatly reduced by increasing
the debtor's exemption and prohibiting his employer from firing
him. Sales by door-to-door salesmen would be regulated, and the
buyer given a three-day right of cancellation. The Code would
prohibit "add-on" contracts under which payments are allocated
proportionally to all items financed, so that none of them are
paid for until the entire account is paid. A deficiency judgment
could not be obtained after repossession of goods by a creditor
if the goods were sold for $1,000 or less. Debtors are also
protected from balloon contracts as the Code requires the lender
3.7 NCA § 9.103.
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to refinance such contracts on terms that are at least as favorable
to the debtor as the original loan. In addition to the above pro-
vision and others for the benefit of consumer debtors, the Code
creates the office of Administrator to aid in its enforcement.
In view of its consumer benefits, one might expect the Code
to be enthusiastically welcomed by consumer advocates. At first,
it appeared that it would. Shortly after it was promulgated the
Code was endorsed by President Johnson's consumer advisory
council and by Miss Betty Furness, the President's Special As-
sistant for Consumer Affairs. A "Position Statement on the
UCCC" by the President's Committee on Consumer Interests
(dated December 3, 1968) gave it an exceptionally strong en-
dorsement. The Code was also endorsed by the National Legal
Aid and Defenders Association.17 The AFL-CIO was luke-warm
about the Code and told its local affiliates to make up their own
minds about it.
After their initial approval of the UCCC, consumer groups
began having more and more misgivings about it. Municipal
Judge George Brunn of California severely criticised it and
pointed out that it was less favorable to consumer creditors, in
many respects, than the existing California law. The Consumers
Advisory Council of the Department of Consumer Affairs of New
York City also criticised the Code and urged that it not be
adopted in New York.179 Consumers Union published an article
entitled "Consumer Credit Code for Lenders" that was extremely
critical of the UCCC. It concluded: "We don't think any state,
no matter how bad its existing credit laws, should adopt the
UCCC without extensive amendments in favor of consumers." 80
Since then, opposition to the Code has been led by the Consumer
Federation of America, which is an alliance of 136 local and
national consumer minded organizations.
After this consumer opposition developed, the UCCC lost
some of the endorsements that it had received initially. The Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defenders Association in effect withdrew
178 Hearing on Consumer Credit Regulations Before the Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 146-60 (1969).179 For criticism by various persons and organizations (including those men-
tioned in the text) see Consumer Research Foundation, Consumer Viewpoints:
Critique of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (2 vols.).1 80 CoNsUmE REPORTS, Mar. 1969, p. 122.
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its endorsement and left the matter to its local organizations. Mrs.
Virginia Knauer, who succeeded Miss Betty Furness as the
President's Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs under the Nixon
Administration, withdrew her predecessor's approval of the
UCCC. That left the Code without any strong, organized con-
sumer support.
On June 20, 1969, a conference of fifty-five consumer experts
was held in Washington, D.C. The conference was co-sponsored
by the National Consumer Law Center of the Boston College Law
School and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
The conference concluded that the UCCC was inadequate to
protect consumer interests and required substantial revision.
Consequently, the National Consumer Law Center was asked to
draft an alternative to the UCCC. The project was funded by a
grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity.
Among the numerous objections to the UCCC, the most
frequent was its high interest rates. The maximum rates under
the UCCC are twenty-four percent on revolving charge accounts
and thirty-six percent on small loans (up to $300) and bank credit
cards. Although those rates are much higher than are permitted
in most states under present laws, the critics of the UCCC greatly
exaggerated their importance when they urged rejection of the
Code simply because of them. In the first place, the rates were
intended merely as ceilings. Competition created by the freedom
of entry doctrine was expected to result in lower rates. That may
well be. Under the present system the net effect of the usury laws
is to give a monopoly on high rate loans to licensed lenders, such
as small loan companies. Those rates may be reduced by the
competition provided by freedom of entry. In the second place,
if the interest ceilings under the Code are too high, the legislatures
of the adopting states should reduce them. The entire Code
should not be rejected simply because its interest rates are too
high.
The provisions of the UCCC with respect to the holder in
due course doctrine have also received a great deal of criticism.
Critics say the holder in due course doctrine should be banned
from all consumer credit transactions. The Code prohibits the
use of negotiable instruments except checks in consumer sales
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contracts, but does not proscribe their use in consumer loans.'s1
Even if the section is violated, a transferee may be a holder in due
course and recover on the instrument.
Critics are also dissatisfied with the UCCC provision with
regard to garnishment of wages. Many of the critics think that
garnishment of wages should be completely abolished. The UCCC
is only slightly more favorable to a wage earner than the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act. It increases the exemption
from thirty times the minimum hourly wage to forty times.1 2
The Code also prohibits an employer from discharging a person
because his wages are garnished, but critics say that employers
will merely give other reasons for fring him.
There has also been dissatisfaction with the Code's provisions
regarding secured creditors. Many of the critics say that no
security interests should be allowed except in the goods financed.
The UCCC permits the taking of real estate as collateral for home
improvement debts of $1,000 or more' 83 and permits cross-col-
lateral.'4 Critics also would like some provisions in the Code
imposing heavy penalties on creditors for forced entry to re-
possess goods upon default. In addition, they think secured
creditors should have to elect between repossession of the col-
lateral and a suit on the debt. Under the Code, a deficiency
judgment may be obtained after repossession if the goods were
sold for more than $1,000. If goods sold for less than $1,000 are
repossessed and sold for more than the debt, the creditor is
allowed to keep all of the proceeds.
Several critics of the Code have berated its failure to create
new causes of action for consumer debtors and stronger remedies
for its enforcement.18 5 The Code gives the debtor a few new
rights of action but his new remedies are chiefly defensive.
Critics say that debtors should be given additional rights of can-
cellation and rescission, that class actions should be authorized,
and that a creditor who has been guilty of oppressive collection
181 UCCC § 2.403.
182 UCCC § 5.105.
183 UCCC § 2.407.
184 UCCC § 2.408.
185 See Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code
Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAw 1039 (1968)- James & Fragomen, Uni-form Consumer Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles V and VI, 57
CEo. L. J. 923 (1969).
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practices should be liable for damages and attorney fees to the
debtor in a tort action.
Probably the most cogent objection that has been made to the
UCCC is its poor draftsmanship. For no more than what the
UCCC does, it is much too prolix. It is also lacking in clarity. Its
prolixity and lack of clarity appear to be caused largely by a
multitude of minor exceptions that resulted from various com-
promises. At any rate, this writer is inclined to agree with the
Association of California Consumers statement that, "Even in a
world where hard-to-understand laws abound, the draft of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code should win an award for unin-
telligibility."-86
The National Consumer Act was drafted to meet the above
objections. In drafting that act, the National Consumer Law
Center relied heavily upon a special committee consisting of per-
sons who had been most critical of the UCCC.
The National Consumer Act [hereinafter NCA] amends many
of the provisions of the UCCC and regulates several matters of
consumer law that the UCCC does not cover.1 7 The NCA also
has fewer exclusions than the UCCC. For example, transactions
with pawnbrokers and utilities and sales of insurance are covered
by the NCA but not by the UCCC.'88
The NCA avoids much of the duplexity of the UCCC by
eliminating the separate treatment of sale and loan credit. The
UCCC covers credit sales in Article 2 and loans in Article 3. The
NCA covers both types of consumer credit transactions in Article
2.
The NCA permits even more freedom of entry with regard
to consumer financing than the UCCC. That is accomplished
by allowing any creditor to charge the maximum rates, rather than
only the supervised lenders.'89 The NCA submits three alternative
provisions prescribing maximum finance charges.190 Each of the
186 See Consumer Research Foundation, Consumer Viewpoints: Critique of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code 183. See also Miller, Some Conundrums in an
Enigma: Three Latent Consumer Credit Transactions under the Oklahoma Version
of the UCCC, 23 OKr.. L. REv. 241 (1970).
187 See Moo, New Consumer Credit Legislation: Which Approach-The UCCC
or NCA? 2 UnANm LAw 439 (1970); Note, Consumer Protection Under the UCCC
and the NCA-A Comparison and Recommendations, 12 ARz. L. RFv. 572 (1970).
188 NCA § 1.202; UCCC § 1.202.
189 NCA § 2.201,
190 Id,
[Vol. 60
UNwom CONSUEmR Cmrr CoDE
alternatives leaves blanks for insertion of interest rates. Although
some of its draftsmen have been very critical of the high rates
permitted by the UCCC, they now take no position on what the
rate ceilings should be."9' Apparently, they have learned from
the experience with the UCCC that it is not advisable to become
involved in arguments over rate ceilings.
The holder in due course doctrine is abolished by the NCA
with respect to consumer transactions. The NCA prohibits a
merchant from taking a negotiable instrument in a consumer
credit transaction, and it makes any holder of such an instrument
subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer. 192 The Act
also invalidates provisions in sales contracts under which con-
sumers waive their defenses against assignees. 93
The NCA goes farther than the UCCC in several other
respects in limiting creditors' practices and remedies. For ex-
ample, it prohibits balloon payments 4 and exempts all wages
from garnishment. 95 It also imposes additional restrictions on
the creation and enforcement of security interests. 9 6 No deficiency
judgment may be obtained unless the unpaid balance of the debt
is $2,000 or more at the time of default. 9' When a deficiency
judgment is obtained, it must be computed by subtracting the
fair market value of the collateral from the balance due on the
debt.9 8 The Act also provides more affirmative remedies for the
debtor and authorizes class actions.99
Although the NCA does not define "unconscionability," it does
list a number of factors to be taken into consideration as pertinent
to that issue.200 It would appear those provisions are of little
value, but they should do no harm.
In addition to the changes which the NCA would make in
the UCCC, the NCA regulates several matters that the UCCC
does not deal with. These include provisions as to credit cards;20'
191 Id. at Comment 2.
192 NCA § 2.405.
'93 NCA § 2.406.
'94NCA § 2.402.
'05 NCA § 5.106.
196 NCA § 2.416.
'9' NCA § 5.211.
'08 NCA § 5.212.
199 NCA H8 5.301-.309.
200 NCA §§ 5.107, 6.109.
201 NCA H8 2.601-.605.
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an article on sales practices, which deals with warranties and
false, misleading or deceptive advertising;0 2 and articles on debt
collection203 and credit reporting agencies.20 4
All of the changes which the NCA would make in the UCCC
are for the benefit of consumers. There would be no diminution
of the rights and remedies provided for consumers by the UCCC.
Despite the fact that it was drafted by some of the UCCC's
severest critics, the NCA is not a radical departure from the
UCCC.
STATE AND FEDERAL ROLES iN CONSUmER CREDrr LAw
While the UCCC was being drafted, Congress enacted the
Consumer Credit Protection Act [hereinafter CCPA]. Title I of
the CCPA is commonly known as the Truth in Lending Act.
Section 123 of that Act 20 5 directs the Federal Reserve Board to
exempt any class of credit transactions within any state from the
requirements of Chapter 2 of the Truth in Lending Act if the
board finds that the state law imposes substantially similar re-
quirements with adequate provision for enforcement. The UCCC
has disclosure requirements with respect to consumer credit
transactions that are substantially similar to those of the Truth
in Lending Act. The NCA requires a creditor to meet the dis-
closure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act and to meet
additional requirements. 20 6
Many proponents of the UCCC have grasped the states' rights
clause of the Truth in Lending Act as an argument for adoption
of the UCCC. They say that creditors will prefer to deal with a
state administrator rather than a federal agency. That seems to
be a poor argument. In the first place, the creditor would only
be exempted from the credit transactions provisions of the Truth
in Lending Act. He would not be exempted from its advertising
provisions2°  or the remainder of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act. Moreover, the same forms should satisfy either the state or
federal requirements. It seems that some states might prefer to
eliminate the disclosure requirements from either the UCCC or
202 NCA Art. 3.
203 NCA Art. 7.
204 NCA Art. 8.
205 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1968).
206 NCA §§ 2.306 2.307.
207 Chapter 2 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-1665 (1968).
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the NCA and leave those matters to federal regulation. The
federal government has already entered the field, and the Federal
Reserve Board has issued regulations and provided machinery for
their enforcement.20 8 Duplication of state and federal regulations
should be avoided. It seems to make little difference whether the
disclosure provisions are enforced by state or federal authority.
CONcLUSION
Nearly everyone would agree that some kind of consumer
credit legislation is needed in most states. The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code contains many provisions that are favorable to con-
sumers. It was drafted from the creditor's viewpoint and depicts
the consumer debtor legislation that creditor groups are willing
to see adopted. On the other hand, the National Consumer Act
was drafted by representatives of consumer groups and depicts
the type of legislation that they want. An examination of the
two proposed statutes reveals that the debtor and creditor groups
are not as far apart as might have been expected. There should
now be a study of the UCCC and the NCA by a neutral group to
resolve their differences. In many cases, alternative provisions
could be submitted.
It may be a long time, however, before a generally acceptable
uniform act on consumer credit can be drafted. After all, this is a
new field of law in which there are many conflicting ideas, (most
of the uniform laws that have been widely adopted have been on
areas of the law that were well crystalized). Consequently, states
that are in need of consumer legislation should not wait for a uni-
versally acceptable uniform act. The UCCC was adopted in Utah
and Oklahoma in 1969. It seems to be working fairly well in
those states. Idaho, Indiana and Wyoming adopted it in 1971.
States that want to adopt new consumer legislation should give
prime consideration to the National Consumer Act. I think it
is superior to the UCCC in many respects. It has better drafting
and combines the treatment of loans and credit sales in one article.
It contains all of the consumer benefits that are provided by the
UCCC and others that are desired by consumer groups. If the
legislature finds that consumer groups have demanded too much
2 08 See Felsenfeld, Competing State and Federal Roles in Consumer Credit
Law, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 487 (1970).
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in some instances, it can delete or amend those provisions of the
NCA.
Some states may want to adopt some consumer credit legis-
lation but eschew the enactment of a comprehensive code such
as the UCCC or the NCA. If so, they will find many ideas and
well drafted provisions in either the UCCC or NCA. For example,
a state could enact the provisions of either of those acts with
respect to the holder in due course doctrine, balloon payments,
confession of judgment, assignment of wages, garnishment of
wages, referral sales, home solicitation sales, deficiency judgments
and many other matters. One of the most basic concepts of the
UCCC, viz., freedom of entry, can be achieved simply by repealing
the usury laws. Or, if rate ceilings are desired, the usury laws
can be amended so as to permit all creditors to charge the high
rates of interest now reserved for small loan companies. That
would restore competition among creditors in the consumer credit
field.
